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Abstract 
In mid-September 2008, money market mutual funds (MMMFs) began to experience run-like 
redemption requests after the Reserve Primary Fund “broke the buck.” As a result, MMMFs 
became reluctant to roll over or invest in commercial paper (CP) and faced the prospect of 
selling asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) they held into a declining market to raise 
cash. The money markets quickly became negatively impacted, and on October 21, 2008, the 
Fed announced the Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF), which would loan 
funds to a series of special purpose vehicles (SPVs) established by the private sector. The 
SPVs would use the funds (and proceeds from ABCP that they issued) to purchase eligible US 
dollar–denominated money market instruments (certificates of deposit, bank notes, and CP) 
from eligible money market investors, a group originally limited to MMMFs. The Fed 
authorized up to $540 billion for the MMIFF, which would have facilitated the purchase of 
$600 billion of assets. No fund accessed the facility, however, and it was closed on October 
30, 2009. Although not utilized, it cannot conclusively be said whether the availability of the 
MMIFF had an impact on the market. Any such impact is difficult to isolate given the 
coexistence of other government programs aimed at addressing similar stresses. 
Keywords: money market mutual funds (MMMFs), certificates of deposit, commercial 
paper, asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), wholesale funding, MMIFF, AMLF, Reserve 
Primary Fund, break the buck 
  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to market liquidity programs. 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
financial-crises/. 








At a Glance 
During the fall of 2008, hundreds of billions of 
dollars were withdrawn from money market 
mutual funds (MMMFs), due to investor 
redemptions sparked by the Reserve Primary 
Fund “breaking the buck”.  Many MMMFs, 
which are significant holders of commercial 
paper (CP) and asset-backed commercial paper 
(ABCP), refused to rollover such securities or to 
make new purchases, especially of longer 
terms. These actions all but froze the market 
for term CP and ABCP putting great stress on 
financial institutions and businesses that relied 
on such funding to make loans to businesses 
and households. Additionally, MMMFs needing 
cash found it difficult to sell their assets into an 
illiquid market. The Money Market Investor 
Funding Facility (MMIFF), was intended to 
improve conditions in the CP and ABCP 
markets and provide MMMFs a market for 
assets that they wanted to sell. 
Under the MMIFF, the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York (FRBNY) was to provide funding to a 
series of special purpose vehicles (SPVs) 
established by the private sector to finance 90% of the amortized purchase of certain term money 
market instruments from eligible investors, originally US MMMFs. The remaining 10% of the 
purchase price was to be funded by the investors’ purchase of subordinated ABCP issued by the SPVs. 
The FRBNY was authorized to lend up to $540 billion under the MMIFF, enabling the SPVs to 
purchase a combined $600 billion of assets. FRBNY loans under the MMIFF were to be fully 
collateralized by the assets of the SPVs, and investors using the facility would absorb approximately 
the first 10% of any losses due to the ABCP being subordinated to the FRBNY loans. (FR OIG 2010). 
Summary Evaluation 
The MMIFF expired on October 30, 2009, and was never utilized, making it difficult to assess what 
the program’s impact might have been. However, its mere existence “may have provided investors 
with additional assurance about holding securities  with  longer -term  maturities  and,  thus,  had  a  
positive effect on the money markets.” However,  given  its coexistence with  other  programs  such  
as  the  Asset -Backed  Commercial  Paper  Money  Market  Mutual  Fund  Liquidity Facility  (AMLF), 
the  US Treasury Department’s Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds, and the  
Commercial  Paper  Funding  Facility,  it  may  ultimately be  difficult  to  isolate  any impact  the 
availability  of  the  MMIFF might have had (FR OIG 2010).  
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To provide funding to a series of SPVs 
established by the private sector to finance the 
purchase of certain money market instruments from 
eligible investors, originally US MMMFs. 
Announcement Date October 21, 2008 
Operational Date November 24, 2008 
Expiration Date October 30, 2009 
Legal Authority Sec. 13(3) of the Federal 
Reserve Act 
Authorization $540 billion 
Peak Utilization  $0 
Participants US MMMFs and certain other 
money market investors 
Rate of FRBNY loan Primary credit rate 
Collateral US dollar CDs, bank notes, 
and CP 
Haircut/Recourse Yes/Yes 
Terms of collateral Originally 90 days or less, 
then 7 to 90 days  
Managed By FRBNY 
Money Market Investor Funding Facility 
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Money Market Investor Funding Facility:  United States Context 
 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to 
USD) 
 
$14,681.5 billion in 2007 




GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to 
USD) 
 
$47,976 in 2007 




Sovereign credit rating (5-year senior 
debt)  














Size of banking system  
$9,231.7 billion in total assets in 2007 




Size of banking system as a percentage of 
GDP  
62.9% in 2007 




Size of banking system as a percentage of 
financial system  
Banking system assets equal to 29.0% of 
financial system in 2007 
Banking system assets equal to 30.5% of 
financial system in 2008 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial 
Development Database 
 
5-bank concentration of banking system  
43.9% of total banking assets in 2007 
44.9% of total banking assets in 2008 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial 
Development Database 
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Foreign involvement in banking system 
22% of total banking assets in 2007 
18% of total banking assets in 2008 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial 
Development Database 
 
Government ownership of banking system  
0% of banks owned by the state in 2008 
 
Source: World Bank, Bank Regulation and 
Supervision Survey 
 
Existence of deposit insurance 
100% insurance on deposits up to $100,000 for 
2007 
100% insurance on deposits up to $250,000 for 
2008 
 
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
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On September 16, 2008, the day after Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, the $62 billion 
Reserve Primary Fund money market mutual fund (MMMF), which had a $785 million 
exposure to Lehman commercial paper (CP)that it wrote down to zero, “broke the buck” by 
announcing a net asset value (NAV) of less than $1 per share (Anderson and Gascon 2009). 
This quickly led to run-like redemption requests by many MMMF investors, especially 
institutional investors who fled prime MMMFs for those investing only in government 
securities. In the week following Lehman’s bankruptcy, investors withdrew $230 billion 
from MMMFs, including $117 billion from prime MMMFs, as they sought out funds investing 
only in government securities (Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni 2011). 
As MMMFs scrambled to raise cash to pay redemptions and maintain their $1 per share 
NAV3, many funds refused to roll over maturing CP or purchase new CP, including asset-
backed commercial paper (ABCP). Further, despite their need for cash, many funds resisted 
selling assets at depressed prices. Notably, ABCP represented approximately 45% of fund 
assets, but the secondary market was limited and experiencing increasing stress (Duygan -
Bump, et al. 2013). 
Further, despite their need for cash, many funds resisted selling assets at depressed prices. 
Notably, ABCP represented approximately 45% of fund assets, but the secondary market was 
limited and experiencing increasing stress (Duygan-Bump et al. 2013). 
Because MMMFs were the largest investor group in CP, their actions led to a general 
contraction in the short-term wholesale funding market; within a month after Lehman’s 
bankruptcy, outstanding CP had declined by $300 billion (Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni 
2011). In addition, CP maturities became severely restricted and rates soon elevated sharply, 
particularly on longer-term paper, making it difficult, if not impossible, for many issuers to 
place their CP (Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni 2011). These developments in turn 
disrupted the business and household financing supported by CP and ABCP, raising concern 
about possible contagion of the broader financial markets and economy (Adrian, Kimbrough, 
and Marchioni 2011).  
On September 19, 2008, the government took steps to address the redemption stresses on 
MMMFs. The US Treasury Department announced the Temporary Guarantee Program for 
Money Market Funds (Temporary Guarantee),4 which offered to guarantee the accounts of 
eligible MMMFs choosing to participate against losses resulting from a fund breaking the 
buck. On that same day, the Federal Reserve (the Fed) announced the Asset-Backed 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
3 During the crisis, many fund sponsors provided significant assistance to their funds, at least 21 of which would 
have “broken the buck” without such aid (Brady, Anadu and Cooper (2012)). 
4 See McNamara 2016 for a discussion of the program. 
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Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF),5 which provided 
loans to depository institutions to purchase CP from the MMMFs experiencing redemption 
pressures.  
Program Description 
On October 21, 2008, with money markets still seized up, the Fed announced the Money 
Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF), which would indirectly fund 90% of the 
amortized purchase price of certain term money market assets from eligible investors. 
including MMMFs. The remaining 10% of the purchase price would be funded by 
subordinated ABCP issued pursuant to the program. 
Under the MMIFF, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) would loan funds to a 
series of special purpose vehicles (SPVs) established by the private sector, which would then 
purchase eligible assets from certain eligible money market investors. The eligible assets 
included US dollar–denominated certificates of deposit (CDs), bank notes, and commercial 
paper issued by 50 highly rated financial institutions that had remaining maturities of at 
least seven and not more than 90 days (FRBNY 2008a). Also, as of November 10, 2008, assets 
had to be eligible for settlement by the Depository Trust Company (DTC); later clearance was 
required. (FRBNY 2008a). A total of $540 billion was authorized for MMIFF loans, so it might 
have been possible for the program to finance the purchase of $600 billion of assets. The 
MMIFF complemented the other actions taken by the government to address MMMF distress 
and the frozen CP market.  
Authority for the MMIFF 
The Fed relied on its emergency authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act 
(FRA) in adopting the MMIFF. Section 13(3) allows a Reserve Bank to make loans to any 
individual, partnership, or corporation in “unusual and exigent circumstances” if the Fed 
determines that the entity is “unable to secure adequate credit accommodations from other 
banking institutions” and that such loans were secured to its satisfaction. In implementing 
the MMIFF, the Fed noted that “the short-term debt markets continued to be under 
considerable strain” and the difficulty being experienced by MMMFs in “selling assets to 
satisfy redemption requests and portfolio rebalancing needs” (Federal Reserve 2008c). The 
Fed hoped that stimulating a secondary market for money market instruments would give 
MMMFs confidence that they could meet liquidity needs for redemption requests, and that 
they would then restart investing in money market instruments and ultimately extend the 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
5 Under the AMLF, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston provided funding to US depository institutions to finance 
purchases of high-quality ABCP from MMMFs experiencing redemption pressures. The ABCP secured the loans, 
which were otherwise without recourse to the borrowing institutions. In its first weeks, the AMLF extended 
$152 billion in loans, but utilization soon decreased significantly. See Wiggins and Metrick 2016 for a discussion 
of the program. 
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terms of their investments (which were then largely being held to less than seven days) 
(Federal Reserve 2008c; FRBNY 2008a).  
Original Proposal  
As originally proposed, the MMIFF was to serve as a backup liquidity facility to the SPVs that 
would fund their purchases of eligible assets by issuing senior and subordinated ABCP. The 
original design was deemed favorable in two ways: (1) the Fed would have a “well-secured 
position”; and (2) industry participants might be more amenable to utilizing a facility that 
was privately managed (Federal Reserve 2008b). However, consultation with industry 
participants produced a substantial revision of the financing to be provided to the SPVs by 
the Fed, so that the Fed’s position shifted to being a direct lender instead of a backup (Federal 
Reserve 2008c). 
The MMIFF was announced on October 21, 2008, and became operational on November 24. 
The facility was originally set to terminate on April 30, 2009; however, the Fed’s Board of 
Governors extended the termination date to October 30, 2009, when the MMIFF expired 
without being used.  
How the MMIFF Was to Work 
According to the FRBNY, under the MMIFF, five SPVs were to be established by JPMorgan 
Chase & Company (rather than by the Fed), which would be the program’s sponsor and 
manager of the conduits. JPMorgan was selected for this role by representatives from the 
MMMF industry (FRBNY 2008a).   
The SPVs would purchase money market instruments meeting certain criteria from 
investors, initially MMMFs, at amortized cost, and pay 90% of the purchase price in cash 
funded with loans from the FRBNY. The remaining 10% of the purchase price would be paid 
by the SPVs by issuing subordinated ABCP to the selling eligible investor.  
It was anticipated that other banks and financial institutions would provide custodial, 
private placement and administrative services to the SPVs, but it is not clear if any such 
contracts were entered into (FRBNY 2008a).  
FRBNY Loans 
Each SPV was eligible to borrow from the FRBNY 90% of the amortized cost of “eligible 
assets” that it intended to purchase from “eligible investors” (both defined below). The 
FRBNY loans would be senior secured funding and collateralized by all the assets of the 
borrowing SPV, providing the FRBNY a 10% haircut. Additionally, the ABCP issued to the 
eligible investor by the SPV would be subordinated to the FRBNY loans and would absorb 
approximately the first 10% of any losses incurred by the SPV (FRBNY 2008c).  
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The FRBNY loans would be overnight loans, but the FRBNY committed to funding the 
purchased assets until their maturity (FRBNY 2008c). The loans would bear interest at the 
primary credit rate, with certain limited subordination if the rate increased above a specified 
amount.6 Any excess spread earned by the SPVs with respect to the yield on the purchased 
assets would be retained as a further buffer against FRBNY losses (FRBNY 2008c). 
The SPVs would be authorized to purchase, in aggregate, up to $600 billion in eligible assets, 
indicating that the FRBNY was authorized to provide up to $540 billion in loans.  
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) 
With respect to each purchase of eligible assets, the SPV would also issue to the eligible 
investor ABCP equaling 10% of the purchase price (amortized cost) of the eligible asset. The 
ABCP would be subordinated to the FRBNY loans and had to be rated at least A-1/P-1/F1 by 
two or more major nationally recognized statistical rating organizations (NRSROs), e.g., S&P, 
Moody’s, and Fitch.7  
The SPV was required to hold the purchased eligible asset until maturity. When it received 
payment from the issuer of the asset, it would then repay the loan to the FRBNY. When all 
the eligible assets had matured and all FRBNY loans were repaid, the SPV would redeem the 
ABCP.  
The ABCP was to bear interest at a rate that was at least 25 basis points below the interest 
rate of the eligible asset sold. This provided an additional cushion of collateral for the 
FRBNY’s loans as they were secured by all the assets of the SPV. Upon the SPV being wound 
down, an eligible investor would retain a right to receive a possible contingent distribution 
of funds that would increase its total yield (including its yield on the ABCP) up to 25 basis 
points above the yield on the eligible asset that it sold, if there was accumulated income 
available in the SPV. In this way, an eligible investor that used the MMIFF retained some 
possibility of sharing in the upside appreciation of the eligible assets that it sold. However, 
only an eligible investor that sold an eligible asset to the SPV had the right to receive any 
contingent distribution; the right was not transferable and did not apply to a person who 




6 “Specifically, if the primary credit rate rose above 50 basis points plus the lower of (i) the current primary 
credit rate and (ii) the primary credit rate 90 days before (the subordination threshold), the FRBNY’s right to 
receive interest above the threshold rate would be subordinated to the rights of the ABCP holders to receive 
principal and interest” (FRBNY 2009b).  
7 Initially, the agencies were not named, but the specific agencies were added as of January 7, 2009 (FRBNY 
2009c). 
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The MMIFF was open, and originally limited to, any fund that qualified as a US 2a-78 MMMF 
(FRBNY 2008a). MMMFs were originally the only eligible investors for two reasons: (1) the 
purpose of the facility was to provide liquidity to MMMFs; and (2) the “key role money 
market mutual funds play as a source of short-term credit for financial and nonfinancial 
corporations” (FRBNY 2008a).  
However, it was always intended that eligibility might be extended to other money market 
investors, and on January 7, 2009, the category of eligible investors was expanded to include, 
in addition to US 2a-7 MMMFs:  
1) US-based securities-lending cash collateral reinvestment funds, portfolios, and 
accounts (securities lenders);9 and  
2) US-based investment funds that operated in a manner like MMMFs, such as certain 
local government investment pools, common trust funds, and collective investment 
funds.10  
The FRBNY was authorized to vet potential eligible investors, including subjecting them to 
debt and/or deposit rating criteria (FRBNY 2008a). 
Eligible Assets 
Eligible assets that an SPV could purchase were initially limited to US dollar—denominated 
certificates of deposit, bank notes, and CP issued by highly rated financial institutions and 
having remaining maturities of 90 days or less. This wording permitted even assets with 
overnight maturities to be eligible assets, contrary to the facility’s stated purpose of easing 
the constraints in the short-term funding market. Therefore, the criteria were refined, as of 
November 10, 2008, to require that an eligible asset have a remaining maturity of at least 
seven and not more than 90 days (FRBNY 2008b).  
Eligible assets also had to be at least $250,000 in value. The MMIFF did not limit how much 
any eligible investor could sell to an SPV.  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
8 Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 2a-7 issued pursuant to the Investment Company Act of 1940. 
9 “Eligible investors will also include any US dollar-denominated cash collateral reinvestment fund, account, or 
portfolio associated with securities lending transactions that is managed or owned by a US bank, insurance 
company, pension fund, trust company, or SEC-registered investment advisor.” (FRBNY 2009a) 
10 “In addition to US 2a-7 money market mutual funds, eligible investors will include funds that are managed 
or owned by a US bank, insurance company, pension fund, trust company, SEC-registered investment advisor 
or a US state or local government entity and are required to (i) maintain a dollar-weighted average portfolio 
maturity of 90 days or less; (ii) hold the fund’s assets until maturity under usual circumstances; and (iii) hold 
only assets that, at time of purchase, are rated by an NRSRO in one of the top three long-term investment-grade 
rating categories (A and above) or the top two short-term investment-grade rating categories (A-2 and above), 
or that are the credit equivalent thereof.” (FRBNY 2009a) 
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Additionally, as of November 10, 2008, eligible assets had to be eligible for settlement at the 
DTC (FRBNY 2008b). This criterion was later refined to require clearance by DTC, not just 
settlement (FRBNY 2009a). As of January 7, 2009, eligible assets were required to have a 
yield of at least 60 basis points above the primary credit rate at the time of purchase by the 
SPV to provide some additional protection to the FRBNY, which was to be paid the primary 
credit rate for its loan (FRBNY 2008b). 
Under the MMIFF, each SPV could purchase only debt instruments issued by the 10 financial 
institutions designated in its operational documents as issuers. Issuers were required to 
have a short-term debt rating of at least A-1/P-1/F1 from two or more NRSROs, and they 
were chosen by representatives of the MMMF industry largely because, (i) they represented 
the largest issuers of highly rated short-term liabilities held by MMMFs, and (ii) they met an 
objective of achieving geographical diversification in each SPV. (FRBNY 2008b).  Designated 
issuers included most of the largest North American and European financial institutions, 
including Bank of America Corp., General Electric Co., BNP Paribas SA, and Société Générale 
SA. (FRBNY 2008b; NASDAQ, n.d.). The Fed also indicated that it might consider expanding 
the list of issuers but only after reviewing the operations of the MMIFF (FRBNY 2008b).  
Downgrade or Default of an Eligible Asset 
If an eligible asset held by an SPV was downgraded, the SPV would cease all asset purchases 
until all the SPV’s assets issued by that issuer had matured.  
 
If there was a payment default with respect to any eligible assets held by an SPV, the SPV 
would cease all asset purchases and repayments on outstanding ABCP. Proceeds from 
maturation of the SPV’s assets were to be used to repay the FRBNY, and upon maturation of 
all assets in the SPV, any remaining funds could be used to repay principal and interest on 
the ABCP. 
Termination and Wind-Down Process 
During any wind-down period, an SPV could not purchase any new assets, however, the 
FRBNY would continue to fund eligible assets held by an SPV during the wind-down process 
(FRBNY 2008a). During wind-down, an SPV could use proceeds from maturing assets to 
repay principal and interest on the FRBNY loans and then to repay principal and interest on 
ABCP that matured on that day (FRBNY 2008a). Upon completion of the wind-down process, 
if there were assets remaining, any contingent payment would be paid to the eligible 









Announced on October 21, 2008, the MMIFF complemented the other programs instituted 
by the government to provide liquidity and stability to MMMFs and promote liquidity in the 
CP markets, the Treasury’s guarantee and the Fed’s AMLF.11 While other programs, such as 
the AMLF and the CPFF12 saw significant use in the fall of 2008 and modest usage thereafter, 
no investor took advantage of the MMIFF.  
Under the AMLF13 (announced a month prior to the MMIFF), the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston (FRBB) provided funding to US depository institutions to purchase high-quality 
ABCP from MMMFs experiencing redemption pressures. The ABCP secured the loans, which 
were otherwise without recourse to the borrowing institutions. Because the Fed made loans 
to depository institutions, which then purchased the ABCP, the Fed could make the AMLF 
operational in a few days by relying on much of its existing discount window lending 
structure. Although the AMLF was adopted without any authorized limit, it permitted loans 
only for purchases of ABCP. The continuing liquidity problems of the MMMFs were perceived 
as greater than the relief the AMLF could provide, and thus the MMIFF, which provided a 
market for a variety of securities held by MMMFs, was adopted (Federal Reserve 2008c). 
Although the MMIFF carried a spending limit, its capacity to finance the purchase of $600 
billion in eligible assets sent a strong message that the Fed was committed to supporting the 
money markets.  
The MMIFF was originally established with an expiration date of April 30, 2009. Although 
not utilized, the Fed extended the program three times, indicating its commitment to 
maintaining the availability of liquidity while markets remained stressed (Federal Reserve 
2009b). The MMIFF expired on October 30, 2009. 
I. Key Design Decisions 
1. The Federal Reserve determined that “unusual and exigent circumstances” existed 
as required by Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. 
In establishing the MMIFF, the Fed relied on its authority under Section 13(3) of the FRA, 
which permitted the Board, in “unusual and exigent circumstances,” to authorize Reserve 
Banks to extend credit to individuals, partnerships, or corporations that were unable to 
obtain adequate credit accommodations, provided that the Reserve Bank was secured to its 
satisfaction. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
11 See page 1 and accompanying footnotes. 
12 The CPFF provided a liquidity backstop to US issuers of CP. The FRBNY would make loans to an SPV (that it 
sponsored) at above-market interest rates to purchase eligible unsecured CP and ABCP from eligible issuers. 
The loans were secured by all the assets of the SPV. Holdings of the CPFF grew to $334 billion by year-end 2008, 
when usage slowed. However, the CPFF was one of the Fed’s largest liquidity programs. (See also Wiggins 2016 
and Wiggins and Metrick 2016.) 
13 See Wiggins and Metrick 2016 for detailed discussion of the AMLF. 
267





In making its determination to invoke Section 13(3), the Fed made note of the continuing 
strain on the short-term debt markets “as money market mutual funds and other investors 
had become increasingly unable to sell assets to satisfy redemption requests and meet their 
portfolio-rebalancing needs” (Federal Reserve 2008c). The Fed further noted in its Section 
129 Report the key role MMMFs played in the funding cycle that permitted financial 
intermediaries to meet the credit needs of businesses and households. The report also 
explained how the current situation presented significant risk to the country’s financial 
stability and economic condition (Federal Reserve 2008d). 
2. The Federal Reserve determined that it would be sufficiently secured. 
The FRBNY was authorized to make loans pursuant to the MMIFF, but under Section 13(3), 
the bank was required to ensure that its loans would be properly secured; several elements 
provided for this.  
First, loans made under the MMIFF were to be overnight loans, and as such, they would 
remain highly liquid. They were to be fully collateralized by the eligible assets being 
purchased. These assets would be highly rated and issued by highly rated financial 
institutions. Additionally, the FRBNY would loan only 90% of the amortized cost of the asset, 
providing a 10% haircut to further protect the FRBNY’s loan. Loans would be nonrecourse 
to the selling eligible investor but fully recourse to the SPV, and they were additionally 
secured by all assets of the SPV.  
The loans would also be senior to the ABCP issued by the SPV to the eligible investor, 
representing 10% of the purchase price. The ABCP was to yield a rate 25 basis points less 
than the yield of the eligible assets sold, providing additional cushion to the SPV, although 
there was the possibility of the investor receiving some appreciation upon winding down.  
Additionally, as of January 7, 2009, eligible assets had to yield at least 60 basis points above 
the primary credit rate at the time of purchase. Since, the SPV was to pay the primary credit 
rate to the FRBNY with respect to any loans, the enhanced rate requirement provided the 
SPV with additional funds that further secured the FRBNY loans.  
In the event of a default by an issuer, the FRBNY would look to the eligible assets held as 
collateral, to the SPV, and to the SPV’s other assets to be made whole before experiencing a 
loss. 
3. The Federal Reserve was to make loans to SPVs, which would purchase eligible 
assets from MMMFs rather than make collateralized loans to the MMMFs or 
purchase and hold the assets directly. 
Under FRA Section 13(3), the Fed did not have authority to purchase the eligible assets 
directly, although it did have the authority to make collateralized loans directly to MMMFs. 
However, except for ABCP, the eligible assets were largely unsecured and might have been 
questioned as acceptable collateral. Also, in September 2008, just a month before adopting 
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the MMIFF, the Fed had approved the Direct Money Market Mutual Fund Lending Facility 
(DMLF), which would have made collateralized loans directly to the MMMFs (Federal 
Reserve 2008a). However, consultation with market participants indicated that they would 
not use the DMLF, and the DMLF was rescinded without implementation by notation vote on 
October 20, 2008. Consequently, it was concluded that an intermediary was needed to 
facilitate the making of collateralized loans to MMMFs, and it was thought that a privately 
sponsored SPV would appeal to the MMMFs (Federal Reserve 2008e). 
Utilizing an SPV required additional structuring and administrative work to be completed 
before the MMIFF could become operational on November 24, 2008, a month after it was 
announced. By comparison, the AMLF, pursuant to which the FRBB made loans to depository 
institutions to purchase certain ABCP from MMMFs, and which utilized existing discount 
window processes and documentation for the basic infrastructure of the program, was 
announced on a Friday and was operating the next Monday. It is not clear whether the 
complexity of the MMIFF contributed to its lack of utilization.  
4. The MMIFF relied on five SPVs rather than one. 
The MMIFF called for five SPVs to be established, and each SPV would be limited to 
purchasing eligible assets from the 10 financial institutions (issuers) designated in its 
operating documents. The issuers were chosen with input from the MMMF industry and 
represented the largest issuers of highly rated, short-term liabilities held by money market 
mutual funds. The distribution of issuers among SPVs was intended to achieve some 
geographical diversification within each SPV (FRBNY 2008). 
5. Only certain high-quality assets were eligible to be purchased by the SPVs. 
To minimize risk, the Fed limited the eligible assets that could be purchased under the 
MMIFF (and as a result, pledged as collateral for the FRBNY loans) to certificates of deposit, 
bank notes, and CP that: 
• Were US dollar–denominated; 
• Had a remaining maturity of 90 days or less; as of June 2009, seven to 90 days; 
• Were issued by a financial institution designated in the operating documents of 
the purchasing SPV; 
• Had a short-term debt rating of at least A-1/P-1/F1 from at least two NRSROs; 
• Had a face value of at least $250,000;  
• As of November 10, 2008, needed to be eligible for DTC settlement; later DTC 
clearance required (FRBNY 2008b; FRBNY 2009a). 
Downgrade or Default of an Eligible Asset 
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 If an eligible asset held by an SPV was downgraded, the SPV would cease all asset purchases 
until all the SPV’s assets issued by that issuer had matured.  
If there was a payment default with respect to any eligible assets held by an SPV, the SPV 
would cease all asset purchases and repayments on outstanding ABCP. Proceeds from 
maturation of the SPV’s assets were to be used to repay the FRBNY, and upon maturation of 
all assets in the SPV, any remaining funds could be used to repay principal and interest on 
the ABCP. 
6. The amount of eligible assets that any eligible investor could sell pursuant to the 
MMIFF was not limited.  
At no time was the amount of assets an eligible investor could sell to an SPV limited by the 
MMIFF. This enabled individual funds to access the program as their needs arose and 
changed.  
7. The amount of eligible assets that an SPV could purchase was not limited. 
The Fed announced that it would commit up to $540 billion under the MMIFF to facilitate 
purchases of up to $600 billion in eligible assets, but the amount of funding that any SPV 
could request was not limited. An alternative strategy would have been to allocate the total 
amount among the five SPVs. By not doing so, the Fed built maximum flexibility into the 
program, allowing the MMIFF to respond to market needs.  
8. The amount of eligible assets of any issuer that an SPV could hold at any one time 
was limited. 
No more than 15% of any SPV’s assets could represent eligible assets of any single issuer. 
However, during the initial ramp-up period, this limit was permitted to rise to 20%. This 
“concentration limit” was most likely adopted to provide diversification and to manage risk 
among the holdings of any one SPV. The limit also would ensure that certain issuers did not 
receive an oversize portion of the benefit (e.g., a secondary market for its securities) offered 
by MMIFF, and the limit furthered the distributive impact of the facility.  
9. The SPVs held the assets they purchased to maturity. 
By holding to maturity the assets that they purchased, the SPVs would validate the Fed’s 
intent that the MMIFF support the short-term debt market by providing longer-term 
holdings that would help stabilize the secondary market and prices.  
10.  The eligible investors shared in the risk of the assets purchased by the SPVs. 
Although the FRBNY loans were to be made without recourse to the eligible investors, the 
investors shared in the downside and upside risk of the MMIFF. First, when it sold an asset 
to the SPV, the eligible investor would receive cash representing 90% of the purchase price 
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of the asset (funded by a FRBNY loan), and ABCP representing the other 10%. The FRBNY 
loan would be secured by the asset purchased, would be recourse to the SPV (and all its 
assets), and would also be senior to the ABCP. Therefore, the ABCP would absorb 
approximately the first 10% of losses experienced by the SPV stemming from any cause, and 
the eligible investor would be made whole only after all FRBNY loans had been repaid.  
Second, the yield on the ABCP was at least 25 basis points less than the yield on the eligible 
asset sold, providing additional spread to the SPV.   Upon maturity of the asset, the SPV would 
repay the FRBNY loan and retire the ABCP. The MMIFF allowed for an adjusting payout by 
each SPV that might increase the total yield to the investor to an amount that was up to 25 
basis points over the yield on the eligible asset sold, but the investor would have to wait until 
the SPV was wound down to determine if it would receive any additional payment.  
11.  The Fed engaged MMMF industry representatives in designing the MMIFF. 
MMMF industry representatives were involved in several decisions made in designing the 
MMIFF, including: (1) choosing JPMorgan to be the sponsor and manager of the conduit SPVs, 
(2) deciding to establish five SPVs, and (3) choosing the 50 issuers whose debt would be 
eligible for purchase. Additionally, Investment Company Institute (ICI), the MMMF industry 
association, was enlisted to play an administrative role and to distribute information. 
The Fed sought this involvement to ensure that the facility would be suitable for the task and 
appropriate to the MMMF industry, a type of regulated entity that the Fed did not usually 
deal with. In fact, the MMIFF was substantially redesigned and reauthorized after 
consultation with industry participants.  
Yet, it still was not utilized. Therefore, questions remain whether the MMIFF was an ill fit, 
despite industry consultation. We have not been able to discern whether the facility’s lack of 
use reflected the Fed’s limited knowledge of MMMFs, the extreme pressure and urgency in 
which it was compelled to make decisions and design billion-dollar rescue facilities, the 
availability of more attractive vehicles to meet the funds’ needs, or some combination of 
these factors.  
II. Evaluation  
Given that the MMIFF was not utilized, very little academic research considering the facility 
exists, and it is difficult to know what its impact on the markets might have been. The Fed 
committed sufficient funds under the facility to purchase up to $600 billion in assets. The 
outflows from prime MMMFs from September to October 2008 totaled approximately 
$500 billion. At the very least, the facility signaled a firm commitment from the Fed to 
maintain impactful liquidity during the stressed period and to encourage the secondary 
market in money market instruments (Bernanke 2008).  
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In this vein, a 2010 Fed Inspector General report posited that “the mere existence of the 
MMIFF may have provided investors with additional assurance about holding securities with 
longer-term maturities and, thus, had a positive effect on the money markets” (OIG 2010). 
However, given its coexistence with other programs such as the Treasury’s guarantee for 
MMMFs and the AMLF, it may ultimately be difficult to isolate any impact that the availability 
of the MMIFF might have had. 
Additionally, one might speculate that the MMIFF was not utilized because it was not as 
attractive as other programs or because circumstances changed. The AMLF, announced on 
September 19, 2008, purchased ABCP from MMMFs without recourse to the fund and was 
available quickly. The Treasury guarantee, announced the same day as the AMLF, coexisted 
with the MMIFF and provided some comfort to fund investors, which may have helped 
reduce redemption requests. By the time the MMIFF became operational on November 24, 
eligible investors may have determined that their liquidity needs were already being met by 
more attractive vehicles. 
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Federal Reserve announces the creation of the Money Market Investor Funding Facility 
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on the Fed’s Money Market Investor Funding Facility to provide cash to money market mutual 
funds. https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/media_prop_up.docx. 
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Federal Reserve Liquidity Provision during the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 (Fleming 
2012) – an overview of the various Federal Reserve lending programs including the MMIFF. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Federal Reserve Liquidity 
Provision During The Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 2012.PDF. 
The Federal Reserve’s Financial Crisis Response D: Commercial Paper Market Facilities 
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Andrew Metrick Commercial Paper Markets Facilities 02-01-2016.PDF. 
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